Federal Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Analysis by David J. Young & Steven W. Tigges
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 28 
Number 1 Volume 28, Winter 1983, Number 1 Article 3 
September 2017 
Federal Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment Clause: A 
Constitutional Analysis 
David J. Young 
Steven W. Tigges 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Taxation-Federal 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David J. Young and Steven W. Tigges (1983) "Federal Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment Clause: A 
Constitutional Analysis," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 28 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol28/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FEDERAL TUITION TAX
CREDITS AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
DAVID J. YOUNG*
STEVEN W. TIGGES**
INTRODUCTION
The right of parents to direct the education of their children is firmly
established in American jurisprudence. Indeed, more than half a century
ago, in the landmark case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters," the Supreme
Court announced that the Constitution itself protects parents' choice to
have their children educated at a private school rather than at a public
institution.2 The economic, social, and political changes which have oc-
curred since Pierce, however, often have rendered this constitutional pro-
tection meaningless. Parents who choose to have their children educated
in a nonpublic school not only must bear the constantly escalating costs
of private education, but also must support public education through
their payment of taxes. Because of this dual financial burden, many par-
ents are precluded from exercising their so-called constitutional right to
* J.D., Ohio State University College of Law, 1955.
** B.S., Ohio State University, 1975; J.D., Ohio State University College of Law, 1981.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See id. at 535. In Pierce, a constitutional objection was raised to a statute that required
parents to send their children between the ages of eight and sixteen to a public school. Id. at
530. The Court held that the statute infringed upon the rights of parents to exert control
over the education of their children. Id. at 534-35; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213-14, 232 (1972) (traditional interest of parents in religious upbringing of children is one
of the factors that must be weighed against the state's interest in imposing regulations on
the education of its citizens).
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send their children to a nonpublic school.'
Congress and a number of state legislatures have responded in a vari-
ety of ways to the need for preserving the viability of nonpublic educa-
tion.4 One such response has been tuition tax benefits for parents who
send their children to nonpublic schools. Since a significant portion of the
nonpublic schools throughout the country are church-affiliated, however,
these tuition tax-benefit programs invariably have generated questions
concerning their validity under the constitutional proscription of govern-
ment aid to religion.' This Article considers the constitutionality of fed-
eral tuition tax credit legislation under the establishment clause of the
first amendment.6
CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Admittedly, the language of the establishment clause is vague. As
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged in Lemon v. Kurtzman,7 "we can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive
area of constitutional law." Traditionally, this vagueness resulted in the
application of a two-part "purpose and effect" test.9 In Walz v. Tax Com-
missioner of New York,'0 however, the Court added a third prong to its
original standard-"excessive entanglement.""
3 Young, Constitutional Validity of State Aid to Pupils in Church-Related Schools
-Internal Tension Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHIo ST.
L.J. 783, 785-86 (1977); Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State:
Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HARV. L. REV. 696, 700-02 (1979).
" See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 239-54 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 607-10 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1968); Note, supra note 3,
at 696 & n.1.
6 See infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
O The establishment clause of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting'the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
7 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
s Id. at 612.
' See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). The purpose-and-effect test first
was articulated in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963); see infra note 36
and accompanying text.
'" 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
" Id. at 674. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court engaged in a full dis-
cussion of the applicable standard:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our
cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .. ;
finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion."
Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
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Although the specific contours of these three elements have under-
gone considerable change since Lemon, this three-part standard has re-
mained the basis of the Court's establishment clause analysis.'" Accord-
ingly, in order for federal tuition tax credit programs to withstand
objections based upon the establishment clause, the resulting benefits
must have both a secular purpose and a secular effect and must not cre-
ate undue governmental involvement with religious elements."
TUITION TAX-BENEFIT LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL ATTITUDES UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: THE Nyquist DECISION
Tuition tax-benefit legislation, at least at the state level, has not been
viewed favorably by the judiciary. 4 The leading case in this area is Com-
mittee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.2 In Ny-
quist, New York legislation provided that parents who have taxable in-
come of less than $5000 per year could receive nonpublic school tuition
reimbursement grants from the state of up to $100 per child.' 6 Parents
who did not qualify for these reimbursement grants, but whose adjusted
gross income was less than $25,000 per year, were eligible for a tuition tax
"benefit," in the form of a reduction from adjusted gross income, 7 for
each of their children who attended a nonpublic elementary or secondary
school.' 8 Unlike the tuition reimbursements, however, the amount of the
tax reduction was unrelated to the amount expended on nonpublic school
See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 748, 754-55 (1976); Hunt v. Mc-
Nair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
"' See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-74
(1973); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir.), affd mem., 442
U.S. 907 (1979); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (D.
Minn. 1978).
" See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798
(1973); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855, 860-61 (1st Cir. 1980);
Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir.), aff'd mer., 442 U.S.
907 (1979); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972), afl'd mem. sub
nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota,
302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344, 354 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975). But see Muel-
ler v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1002-03 (D. Minn. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir.), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 82-195); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union
v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1322 (D. Minn. 1978). Recently, the Court granted certiorari
in the case of Mueller v. Allen, 51 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 82-195) to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute allowing a tax deduction for private school
tuition. See Glaberson, Justices to Decide Tax Credit For Private-School Tuition, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 5, 1982, at 1, col. 2. It is interesting that this case will be considered while a proposal
for a federal tuition tax credit is pending before Congress. Id. at 2, col. 3.
"2 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
16 Id. at 764. The reimbursement grant could not exceed 50% of tuition actually paid. Id.
11 Id. at 765 & n.18.
18 Id. at 765-66.
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tuition. 9
The Supreme Court ruled that both programs violated the establish-
ment clause insofar as neither could satisfy the secular-effect element of
the Court's three~part analysis. 0 With respect to the tuition reimburse-
ment program, the Court stated that the statute's lack of specifically ar-
ticulated secular restrictions caused the program to have the "unmistaka-
ble" effect of subsidizing sectarian schools."' Condemning the tuition tax-
benefit program, the Court asserted that, for purposes of constitutional
analysis, there should be no significant distinction between receiving an
actual cash payment for sending one's child to a nonpublic school and
being permitted to lessen a tax burden for undertaking the same
activity.2 2
Opponents of federal tuition tax credit legislation argue that Nyquist
is determinative of whether such legislation would be unconstitutional.28
Such a contention ignores both compelling assertions to the contrary and
the reality that this area of constitutional law is particularly unsettled.
Professor Philip Kurland's remarks on the subject remain accurate today.
With respect to "the continuing question whether the national govern-
ment can contribute financially to parochial education, directly or indi-
rectly," Professor Kurland stated that "anyone suggesting that the an-
swer, as a matter of constitutional law, is clear one way or the other is
either deluding or deluded."2 4 Nyquist was merely one chapter in a con-
tinuing constitutional saga. Decisions of the Court since Nyquist indicate
a shift in analytical emphasis, if not a fundamental restructuring of estab-
lishment clause doctrine. 2' These latter decisions leave the continuing vi-
ability of Nyquist in question. Thus, the constitutionality of federal tui-
tion tax credits cannot be resolved merely by citation to Nyquist or any
other case. Resolution of the issue requires an independent and detailed
examination of federal tuition tax credits in light of the entire body of
establishment clause doctrine.
FEDERAL TUITION TAX CREDITS AND THE SECULAR-
PURPOSE ELEMENT
Although viable federal tuition tax credit legislation must have a sec-
ular purpose, this requirement does not mean that the federal govern-
19 Id.
20 Id. at 798.
21 Id. at 783.
22 Id. at 789-91.
22 See id. at 761 n.5; Young, supra note 3, at 784, 792.
24 P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 111 (1962); see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5 (1973).
" See infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
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ment must be acting to promote purely secular goals. In Walz v. Tax
Commission,2o for example, Chief Justice Burger noted that "[t]he legis-
lative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement
nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility. 2 7 In
this light, the secular-purpose test does not seem to require that govern-
ment have a secular purpose, but rather that it not have a religious pur-
pose. The distinction is significant. A pure secular-purpose requirement
would mean that any legislative consideration of religious goals would be
unlawful. Even a brief reading of the cases indicates otherwise. In the
school-prayer cases, for example, many of the Justices seemed to recog-
nize a "non-religious" purpose.1 Indeed, there are only two cases in
which the Court invalidated legislation for lack of a secular purpose.2 9
Furthermore, the Court's method of discerning whether a permissible sec-
ular purpose exists is not a searching one. The Court merely looks to the
purpose asserted by the legislature. In Lemon, for example, the Court
stated that "[t]he statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended
to enhance the quality of secular education in all schools . . . .There is
no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else."
30
THE SECULAR-EFFECT ELEMENT
The Shifting Meaning of Secular Effect and Continued Viability of
Nyquist
Justice Harlan once remarked that "it is far easier to agree on the
purpose that underlies the first amendment's establishment and free ex-
ercise clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should gov-
-6 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
's See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 225 (1963).
9 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
In Stone and Epperson, there was disagreement among the Justices concerning whether a
secular motive might be present. Epperson involved an anti-evolution statute that forbade
the teaching of evolution in public schools and universities. 393 U.S. at 98. The Court invali-
dated the statute because it sought to remove a theory concerning the origin of man that
conflicted with the Biblical account. Id. at 109. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, stated
that the motivation behind the statute simply may have been to eliminate this source of
controversy from the schools. Id. at 112-13 (Black, J., concurring). In Stone, a Kentucky
statute, which provided for the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in every public
school classroom, was held unconstitutional. 449 U.S. at 41. Justice Rehnquist, disputing the
Court's rejection of the stated secular purpose for the statute, id. at 43 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting), maintained that the Ten Commandments "have had a significant impact on the
development of secular legal codes of the Western World," and as such the findings of the
state on this matter should be accorded deference. Id. at 45.
30 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613.
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ern their application."' This observation is perhaps most accurate with
respect to the secular-effect elements of the establishment clause test.
Over the past 2 decades, this element has undergone numerous subtle yet
highly significant transformations in meaning. The unfortunate conse-
quence has been that the exact contours of "secular effect" are difficult to
perceive from one Supreme Court decision to the next. Proper under-
standing of the secular-effect test nevertheless is crucial to any constitu-
tional evaluation of federal tuition tax credit legislation.
The secular-effect requirement traditionally meant that legislation
would be held unconstitutional only if its primary or principal effect was
"to influence-either positively or negatively-the pursuit of a religious
tradition or the expression of a religious belief."3 2 In School District v.
Schempp,3 for example, the Court stated that, in order for the legislation
"to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. '"34 This
standard was quoted with approval 5 years later in Board of Education v.
Allen, s" in which the Court upheld textbook loans to students attending
nonpublic schools."s
This formulation of the secular-effect standard reached maturity in
Tilton v. Richardson," wherein the Court upheld construction grants
provided to religious colleges under Title I of the Higher Education Facil-
ities Act of 1963.38 In Tilton, Chief Justice Burger declared that "[t]he
crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institu-
,tion as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal
" Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 839 (1978). The secular-effect requirement may
affect either the free exercise clause or the establishment clause. Id.
33 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34 Id. at 222 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)) (emphasis added).
-' 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
36 Id. at 243. The Court's discussion in Allen as to why a textbook loan program did not
have a "primary effect of advancing religion" is helpful in understanding the primary-effect
concept. The Allen Court stated:
The test is not easy to apply, but the citation of Everson by the Schempp Court
to support its general standard made clear how the Schempp rule would be applied
to the facts of Everson. The statute upheld in Everson would be considered a law
having "a ... primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." We reach
the same result with respect to the ... law [challenged here]. . . .The law merely
makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend books free of
charge. . . .Perhaps free books make it more likely that some children chose to at-
tend a sectarian school, but that . . . does not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional
degree of support for a religious institution.
Id. at 243-44.
31 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
Id. at 679-84.
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or primary effect advances religion. ' 39 This clearly was not a "no-aid"
standard. Rather, under Tilton and the earlier cases, it appears that par-
ticular legislation did not violate the establishment clause if its necessary
effect was at least arguably nonreligious.40
The fairly permissive secular-effect standard, however, did not re-
main controlling. The first intimation of a shift toward a more discerning
test was seen in Walz and Lemon. Neither of these cases, however, elabo-
rated upon the secular-effect element 1 and, in failing to do so, cast the
standard into a state of confusion which ultimately led to open discord
among the Nyquist Justices.2
While Nyquist invalidated New York's tuition reimbursement and
tax-benefit programs upon the ground that they impermissibly provided
"financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions,""' the majority's
rationale was by no means persuasive. Justice Powell, who authored the
majority opinion, conceded that the controversial legislation effectively
perpetuated "a pluralistic educational environment" and protected "the
fiscal integrity of overburdened public schools."" He also acknowledged
that these effects were essentially secular." Notwithstanding that these
"effects" were similar to those found in Allen,"' Justice Powell regarded
the New York legislation as lacking a "primary secular effect.'
7
Justice Powell's unique textual application of the secular-effect test
did not escape notice. In a dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, took the majority to task,
arguing that they had ignored precedent: "[T]he test is one of 'primary'
effect, not any effect. The Court makes no attempt at that ultimate judg-
ment necessarily entailed by the standard heretofore fashioned in our
cases."" Justice Powell and the Nyquist majority retorted and, in so do-
ing, seemingly recognized that they had rewritten the secular-effect test.'
9
" Id. at 679.
40 See id. at 681-82 (construction grants); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-48
(1968) (textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (busfare).
41 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970). The Lemon Court was unable to decide the issue of state aid to nonpublic
schools on grounds of excessive entanglement without addressing the secular-effect test. See
403 U.S. at 613-14.
" See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 n.39 (finding of primary secular effect does not preclude
further scrutiny for effect of advancing religion), 822-24 (White, J., dissenting) ("a resulting,
but incidental, benefit to religion should not invalidate [a law]").
" Id. at 783.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 783 & n.39.
" Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44.
4' Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 n.39, 798.
48 Id. at 823 (White, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 783 n.39. The Nyquist Court, in addressing Justice White's dissent, stated:
28 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1983
The Court in Nyquist thus worked a dramatic transformation of the
meaning of "secular effect." After Nyquist, instead of the "arguably non-
religious" test of Allen and Tilton, legislation must have merely a remote,
indirect, and incidental beneficial impact upon religious interests.5 0 Ac-
cording to the Nyquist majority, even if a statute has a "primary" secular
effect, it is invalid if it also has a "direct and immediate effect" of aiding
religion." Such a standard is onerous indeed.2
That Nyquist completely rewrote the law of secular effect was star-
tling enough, but the way in which the Court proceeded to interpret its
newly adopted "no aid," "remote and incidental" standard was even more
extraordinary. Given that the New York legislation had an apparently
permissible secular effect according to earlier cases such as Allen, Justice
Powell found it necessary, in order to strike down the legislation, to con-
strue his "remote and incidental" concept in a manner entirely novel to
establishment clause doctrine. He reasoned that, notwithstanding any le-
gitimate and permissible primary secular effects the legislation may have
possessed, the "great majority" of the nonpublic schools toward which it
was directed were sectarian.13 Accordingly, asserted Justice Powell, the
effect of the legislation was "unmistakably to provide desired financial
support for non-public, sectarian institutions. 54
Appellees, focusing on the term "principal or primary effect" which this Court has
utilized in expressing the second prong of the three-part test, . . . have argued that
the Court must decide ... whether the "primary" effect of New York's tuition grant
program [and its tuition tax-benefit program] is to subsidize religion or to promote
... legitimate secular objectives. Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion . . .simi-
larly suggests that the Court today fails to make this "ultimate judgment." We do not
think that such metaphysical judgments are either possible or necessary. Our cases
simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a "primary" effect to
promote some legitimate end under the State's police power is immune from further
examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and immediate effect of ad-
vancing religion .... [I]nstead, approval [of laws in our prior cases] flowed from the
finding ... that they had only a remote and incidental effect advantageous to reli-
gious institutions.
Id. (citations omitted).
5 Id.
5, Id.; see infra note 52 and accompanying text.
52 Professor Tribe has summarized aptly the impact of Nyquist:
The constitutional requirement of "primary secular effect" has thus become a misno-
mer; while retaining the earlier label, the Court [in Nyquist] has transformed it into a
requirement that any non-secular effect be remote, indirect and incidental. This
shift is significant, for the remote-indirect-and-incidental standard plainly compels a
more searching inquiry, and comes closer to the absolutist no-aid approach to the
establishment clause than the primary effect test did.
L. TRmBE, supra note 32, at 840 (emphasis in original).
53 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.
" Id.
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Justice Powell's "great majority" argument was not entirely foreign
to establishment clause jurisprudence. Judicial scrutiny of the percentage
of religious-affiliated persons or institutions within the class benefited
had been employed in previous cases to determine whether such a pro-
gram had a permissible secular purpose." As Chief Justice Burger ob-
served, however, the great-majority argument was irrelevant to discern
whether legislation had a permissible secular effect."s In sum, Nyquist
adopted what amounts to a "no aid" approach. According to Justice Pow-
ell, if the class of beneficiaries of an educational aid program can be char-
acterized as "significantly religious," then the program's effect is not
merely "remote and incidental" and, therefore, the program must be ad-
judged unconstitutional. 7 Such a no-aid test was absolutely necessary for
the Court to invalidate the New York statutes at issue in Nyquist.s s
It is debatable whether any meaningful program benefiting nonpublic
education, even if carefully tailored, could survive the Nyquist no-aid
standard. Indeed, in the first post-Nyquist decision to confront tuition
tax-benefit legislation, the court read Nyquist to be an absolute prohibi-
tion of any religious effect whatsoever, no matter how tangential the ef-
fect might be.5 9 In Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota,"' the
Supreme Court of Minnesota was faced with a state statute that provided
a tax credit for parents who paid tuition to send their children to a non-
public elementary or secondary school."1 The trial court found that the
statute satisfied each prong of the three-part establishment clause test
and hence was constitutional." On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed on secular-effect grounds.63 The court initially noted that
" See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 608, 612-13 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 247-48 & n.9 (1968).
" Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 804-05 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the
percentage of "beneficiaries of an educational program of general application who elect to
utilize their benefits for religious purposes" is not a criterion for constitutionality).
See id. at 783 & n.39.
" See id. The majority recognized the apparent secular effects of New York's tuition-reim-
bursement and tax-benefit programs. Id. The Court indicated that because New York had
"legitimate, nonsectarian state interests" supporting each part of the amendments, it had to
base its decision upon either the effect or entanglement test. Id. at 773-74. As the dissent
noted, under any other more lenient secular-effect standard, particularly those used in cases
such as Allen, Tilton and Everson, the legislation would have been upheld. Id. at 823-24
(White, J., dissenting). The key to the Nyquist result, therefore, was its adoption of the "no-
aid, remote and incidental" secular-effect approach. Id. at 783 n.39.
11 Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota, 302 Minn. 216, 233, 224 N.W.2d 344, 353
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
" 302 Minn. at 233, 224 N.W.2d at 344, 353.
" Id. at 217-18, 224 N.W.2d at 345.
" Id. at 225-26, 224 N.W.2d at 347, 349.
" Id. at 234-35, 224 N.W.2d at 353-54.
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"[a]bsent subsequent decision of the [United States] Supreme Court,"
the trial court's finding that the legislation had a permissible secular ef-
fect "was fully justified under the standards established .. .in Tilton v.
Richardson.'"4 According to the Minnesota court, however, the interven-
ing Supreme Court decisions altered the course of determining establish-
ment clause questions:" "In applying the 'primary effects test' we must
be guided by the realization . . .that this is no longer a primary effects
test, but an 'any effects' test. Under such a standard, the legislation in
question cannot pass constitutional muster.""
The accuracy of the Minnesota Supreme Court's reading of Nyquist
was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Meek v. Pit-
tenger,67 in which the Court held that the Nyquist formulation of secular
effect was a virtual prohibition against all aid of any substance.68
Meek presented a challenge to Pennsylvania statutes creating three
assistance programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary education."s
Expressing an unwillingness to overrule Allen, the Court upheld Pennsyl-
vania's textbook loan program.7 0 The two remaining programs, however,
were struck down-the auxiliary services program because it created an
impermissible "excessive entanglement between church and state"7' and
the instructional materials program because it had the impermissible ef-
fect of advancing religion.72 In invalidating the latter, it was clear that the
Court was following the remote-and-incidental formula developed in Ny-
quist. Justice Stewart, author of the majority opinion, initially spoke of
the necessity that any benefit to church-related schools be "indirect and
incidental. '7 8 Justice Stewart then announced, explicitly relying upon
Nyquist, that any "substantial aid" to church-related schools violates the
secular-effect requirement, because such "substantial aid . . . inescapably
Id. at 225-26, 224 N.W.2d at 349.
Id. at 227-28, 224 N.W.2d at 350.
Id. at 232, 224 N.W.2d at 353.
e7 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
See id. at 366. The Court stated that the aid in question, although neutral on its face,
"results in the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity." Id.
69 Id. at 352-55. In Meek, the three assistance programs for nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary education were (1) a textbook loan program virtually identical to that upheld in
Allen; (2) a similar program providing for loans of instructional materials such as maps,
charts, and audio-visual equipment; and (3) an auxiliary services program, by which reme-
dial education, guidance and counseling, and speech and hearing therapy services were fur-
nished to nonpublic schoolchildren. Id.
70 Id. at 359-62. The Court stated that the benefit of the textbook loan program went di-
rectly "to parents and children, not to the nonpublic schools." Id. at 361 (footnote omitted).
71 Id. at 367-72.
71 Id. at 362-66.
73 Id. at 364-65. Allowable indirect-and-incidental benefits of government assistance pro-
grams include school lunches, health facilities, and bus transportation. Id. at 364.
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results in the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity. 74
The Meek-Nyquist no-aid standard apparently terminated the abil-
ity to provide any meaningful assistance to nonpublic elementary and
secondary education.7 5 Since at least a significant portion of nonpublic
schools are church-related,7 6 Meek and Nyquist effectively erected an ir-
rebuttable presumption that aid to nonpublic schools will have a consti-
tutionally impermissible religious effect. The Meek-Nyquist no-aid stan-
dard, however, has not remained intact. Subsequent to those decisions,
the Court seemingly shifted back to the more flexible secular-effect stan-
dard delineated in cases such as Allen and Tilton.77 The first hint of this
retreat to a more favorable posture regarding assistance to nonpublic edu-
cation appeared in Wolman v. Walter.78
In Wolman, the Court upheld those portions of an Ohio statute au-
thorizing expenditures of state funds to supply nonpublic school students
with textbooks, standardized testing and scoring services, speech and
hearing diagnostic services, and special education therapeutic and reme-
dial services.7 9 Although the Court relied upon Meek and Nyquist to in-
validate the sections of the statute which provided nonpublic schools with
instructional materials and field trip services, it was clear that the no-aid
standard of Meek and Nyquist was not being applied fully.80 Indeed,
many of the programs upheld in Wolman were strikingly similar to those
condemned in Meek."1 Unfortunately, Wolman did not engage in any de-
tailed elaboration of the analytical construct that was being applied. Jus-
tice Blackmun's opinion, instead, focused upon previous decisions con-
cerning similar statutory provisions.8 2
The implication that the Court had retreated from the no-aid ap-
proach of Meek and Nyquist was confirmed in Committee for Public Ed-
" Id. at 366.
75 See Young, supra note 3, at 792-95.
10 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 816 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice White noted that of the 5.2 million nonpublic school students in the
United States in 1972, 83 percent were enrolled in Catholic schools. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
77 See infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
78 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
79 Id. at 236-48. The Court remarked that the textbook program was very similar to the
programs upheld in Allen and Meek. Id. at 237-38 & n.6.
" See id. at 250-55. The Court relied primarily upon the fact that there had been no at-
tempt to separate the secular from the sectarian functions of the materials and equipment.
Id. at 250-51. It is interesting, however, that nowhere in the Wolman opinion did Justice
Blackmun cite footnote 39 of the Nyquist decision.
"' See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
" Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 236-55; see Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Levitt, 461 F.
Supp. 1123, 1127 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
28 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1983
ucation v. Regan.8' Regan involved a challenge to a New York statute
authorizing the use of state funds to reimburse nonpublic schools for the
costs of performing various testing and reporting services required by
state law.'" An earlier version of the statute had applied to both state-
and teacher-prepared examinations. s5 Finding that reimbursement for the
latter posed the potential for state funding of examinations reflecting "re-
ligious instruction," the Court had struck down the earlier legislation in
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education (Levitt 1).86 Following Levitt I,
the New York legislature in 1974 enacted the statute that the Court even-
tually confronted in Regan.87 Although the 1974 version was limited to
reimbursement of state-prepared examinations, and thus according to
Levitt I should have been acceptable, it nevertheless was invalidated by a
federal district court in Levitt 1.88 The district court relied extensively
upon the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Meek for the proposi-
tion that any "substantial aid" to nonpublic, predominantly church-affili-
ated schools is unconstitutional."'
Levitt II was appealed directly to the Supreme Court, where surpris-
ingly, given the apparent clarity of the Meek-Nyquist no-aid rule, it was
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Wolman opin-
ion.90 On remand, the district court in Levitt IV was faced with appar-
ently irreconcilable Supreme Court precedent. Whereas Meek and Ny-
quist purported to forbid all "substantial aid" to nonpublic, pre-
dominantly church-affiliated schools, Wolman at least impliedly indicated
that the Meek-Nyquist formulation of the secular-effect test was no
longer to be strictly followed. Initially, the district court framed the "cen-
tral issue" as whether the New York statute had the primary effect of
advancing religion," which included an inquiry into the statute's "direct
and immediate" effect."s Furthermore, the court observed that at least
prior to Wolman, Meek "virtually mandated" the conclusion that the
1974 New York legislation had the unconstitutional effect of directly and
.3 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
" Id. at 648.
" Id. The 1970 statute did not contain an auditing requirement for school records which
would guarantee that public money would not be used for sectarian schools. Id. at 649.
" 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
a 444 U.S. at 650-52. The 1974 statute did not "reimburse nonpublic schools for the prepa-
ration, administration, or grading of teacher-prepared tests." Id. at 652. In addition, this
statute did require an audit of public-fund expenditures. Id.
" Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
99 Id. at 1178-80. The Levitt H court stated that, absent the Meek rationale, it might have
agreed that the statute's primary effect was not to promote religion. Id. at 1178.
- 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
" Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
92 Id.
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immediately advancing religion.' 3 Nevertheless, the district court in Lev-
itt IV proceeded to reject the Meek-Nyquist secular-effect test and,
based upon Wolman, adopted a "more flexible concept" of secular ef-
fect.s' Analyzing the 1974 legislation under such a concept, the court de-
termined that the legislation indeed had a primary secular effect and, ac-
cordingly, upheld the statute though substantially similar to that
previously invalidated in Levitt 11."5
Levitt IV was appealed directly to the Supreme Court, at which time
it became the Regan case. 6 There, the appellants argued that the district
court's application of a more flexible concept was contrary to Meek.'7 Jus-
tice White, who authored the majority opinion, disagreed. After recogniz-
ing that the district court had adopted a more flexible approach to secu-
lar effect, Justice White attempted to explain why such a test was not
necessarily inconsistent with Meek.9
"7 Id. at 1127.
o Id. The court stated:
It appeared to us that in Meek the Court... was establishing a per se rule prohibit-
ing any state aid to educational activities carried out in sectarian schools .... Ap-
plied consistently, Meek would allow only state aid coming under the mantle of "gen-
eral welfare" programs serving the health and safety of school children.
Although Wolman does not expressly renounce Meek's theory that aid to a secta-
rian school's education activities is per se unconstitutional, it does revive the more
flexible concept that state aid may be extended to such a school's educational activi-
ties if it can be shown with a high degree of certainty that the aid will only have
secular value of legitimate interest to the State and does not present any appreciable
risk of being used to aid transmission of religious views. It is this concept which we
apply to the provisions of the statute. before us.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
95 461 F. Supp. at 1128-31. The district court determined that due to the "secular nature of
the examinations and the almost entirely mechanical method for their administration,"
there was little danger that the tests would be used to foster religious principles. Id. at 1128.
Furthermore, the court pointed to the auditing mechanisms as an additional safeguard. Id.
- 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980).
" Id. at 661. The appellants stressed "[tihat any aid to a sectarian school is suspect since
its religious teaching is so pervasively intermixed with each and every one of its activities."
Id.
98 Id. at 653-62. Justice White stated:
The difficulty with [appellants'] position is that a majority of the Court, includ-
ing the author of Meek v. Pittenger [Justice Stewart], upheld in Wolman a state
statute under which the State, by preparing and grading tests in secular subjects,
relieved sectarian schools of the cost of these functions, functions that they otherwise
would have had to perform themselves and that were intimately connected with the
educational processes. Yet the Wolman opinion at no point suggested that this hold-
ing was inconsistent with the decision in Meek. Unless the majority in Wolman was
silently disavowing Meek, in whole or in part, that case was simply not understood by
this Court to stand for the broad proposition urged by appellants and espoused by
the District Court in Levitt II.
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The Regan Court then affirmed the district court's decision that New
York's testing reimbursement program was valid under the establishment
clause. 9"
Although Justice White stated that Regan's more flexible concept of
secular effect did not mean that Meek, and accordingly Nyquist, had
been undercut, his assertion is unpersuasive.0 0 Had the Meek-Nyquist
no-aid formulation been followed in Wolman and Regan, it is difficult to
perceive' how the programs challenged in those cases could have been up-
held, since those programs undoubtedly afforded "substantial," "direct,"
and "immediate" aid to church-related elementary and secondary
schools.'0 1 Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Regan, expressed just this dif-
ficulty. The legislation upheld by Regan, Justice Blackmun contended,
involved the same sort of direct and substantial aid that was prohibited
by Meek and Nyquist.I02 Justice Blackmun could rationalize this incon-
sistency only by concluding that certain of the Justices, who were previ-
ously hostile to assistance for nonpublic education, had undergone a
change of heart.103
Notwithstanding Justice White's claim that Regan and Wolman are
consistent with Meek and Nyquist, Justice Blackmun appears to have ad-
vanced the better argument. Regan and Wolman simply did not apply
the no-aid, secular-effect test of Meek and Nyquist. This was not only the
express conclusion of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
in Regan, but also that of the district courts in Levitt IV'01 and National
Coalition for Public Education v. Harris.05 A majority of the Court has
rejected the Meek-Nyquist no-aid, remote-and-indirect formulation and
instead has adopted a secular-effect standard by which governmental as-
sistance for nonpublic education will satisfy the secular-effect element if,
Id. at 661.
" Id. at 662.
100 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Professor Tribe believes that the "remote and
incidental" secular-effect test of Nyquist was essentially a no-aid approach to the establish-
ment clause. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 840; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Professor Tribe's conclusion is borne out by Meek, with its statement that "any substantial
aid" to nonpublic, predominantly church-affiliated schools violates the secular-effect test.
Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
101 See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
302 Regan, 444 U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was joined in his
dissenting opinion by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
303 Id. at 663-64.
,04 461 F. Supp. at 1127-28.
10 489 F. Supp. 1248, 1269 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. National Coalition
for Pub. Educ. v. Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808 (1980). The National Coalition case upheld the
constitutionality of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 as used by the
New York City Board of Education in developing a remedial education program with federal
funds. Id. at 1255, 1270.
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according to Regan, it can be "shown with sufficient clarity that . . .
[such assistance will] serve the State's legitimate secular ends without
any appreciable risk of being used to transmit or teach religious views.","
This "appreciable risk" test, of course, reflects merely the Regan Court's
adoption of the "more flexible concept" of secular effect developed in
Wolman and recognized by the district court in Levitt IV.0r
The secular-effect standard thus has evolved from the relatively per-
missive "primary effect" tests of Tilton and Allen to the strict no-aid test
of Nyquist and Meek, and back to the more flexible Regan appreciable-
risk approach. The importance of this trend for federal tuition tax credit
legislation is considerable. Nyquist is the most frequently raised constitu-
tional objection to federal tuition tax credits. 0 8 Opponents of federal tui-
tion tax credit legislation argue that Nyquist demands the conclusion
that federal tuition tax credits would violate the secular-effect element.14 "
As explained earlier, however, the result reached in Nyquist was a direct
consequence of its no-aid test. Given that the no-aid test was a dramatic
transformation of prior law, it is likely that the result reached in Nyquist
would have been different had the Court not adopted its no-aid approach.
This is significant since the no-aid approach is no longer an accurate
statement of the meaning of the establishment clause. The Meek-Nyquist
definition of secular effect was, at least implicitly, disavowed in Regan.1 10
In its place, the Court has substituted Regan's appreciable-risk
concept.""
Nyquist retained vitality only so long as the no-aid test upon which
it was based remained good law. With that test now rejected, and hence
with its major if not sole source of analytical support undercut, Nyquist
must be considered questionable precedent by which to evaluate future
tuition tax-benefit legislation. The two post-Nyquist court of appeals de-
cisions on tuition tax benefits, Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v.
Norberg1 and Public Funds for Public Schools v. Byrne,"s must be con-
'" 444 U.S. at 662.
107 Id.
' See, e.g., Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 518 (3d Cir.), aff'd sub
nom. Beggans v. Public Funds for Pub. Schools, 442 U.S. 907 (1979); Minnesota Civil Liber-
ties Union v. Minnesota, 302 Minn. 216, 232-33, 224 N.W.2d 344, 352-53 (1974), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
" See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
"o See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661 (1980). Justice White's opin-
ion in Regan noted that the decision of Meek v. Pittenger is not to be interpreted as holding
that any aid to secular educational functions of sectarian schools is forbidden. Id.
Id. at 662.
112 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
"1 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Beggans v. Public Funds for Pub. Schools, 442
U.S. 907 (1979).
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sidered suspect for the same reason. Neither Norberg nor Byrne ad-
dressed whether the Nyquist formulation of secular effect remains valid.
Rather, the court in each case accepted, with little hesitation, Nyquist's
no-aid approach and, on that basis, struck down the legislation before
it."4
Whether federal tuition tax credits will be deemed to have a permis-
sible secular effect cannot be resolved merely by reliance upon Nyquist or
the cases which have accepted its view of secular effect. Given the
changes that have occurred in this area since Nyquist, the secular-effect
issue can be answered only by analysis of the factors which traditionally
have been determinative of secular effect, in light of the Regan apprecia-
ble-risk standard which currently governs this aspect of constitutional
law.
Traditional Measures of Secular Effect
Separability and Breadth
Although the rigor with which the secular-effect element has been
applied has undergone significant fluctuation from Everson to Regan, the
focal points of judicial inquiry into the issue seemingly have remained
relatively constant. Professor Tribe has suggested that two factors, "sepa-
rability" and "breadth," are of critical importance in determining
whether particular legislation survives the secular-effect test."6 According
to Professor Tribe, the separability factor translates into "whether the
secular impact is sufficiently separable from the religious" impact."' His
breadth analysis concerns the class of persons benefited by the legislation:
whether "religious enterprises are benefited no more than, and only as
part of, some much broader category.""' Both factors are premised upon
a rationale of "symbolic identification" by the'public of governmental and
religious activity."' With respect to separability, the relevant inquiry is
whether the public perception of a governmental program is that govern-
ment is "aiding" religion, rather than, for example, merely aiding individ-
ual persons without regard to their religious attitudes.", Similarly, the
hypothesis with respect to the breadth factor is that "the broader the
class benefited, the less likely it is that the program will be perceived as
aid to religion."' 2
'4 See Norberg, 630 F.2d at 858-59; Byrne, 590 F.2d at 518.
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 840-46.
. Id. at 840.
117 Id. at 845.
11 See id. at 844-45.
"' See id. at 843-44.
ISO Id. at 845.
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Perhaps the clearest example of the significance of the separability
factor is the so-called "child benefit" doctrine set forth in Everson v.
Board of Education'2 and Board of Education v. Allen.'2 2 In Everson,
the Court upheld a New Jersey transportation reimbursement program,
vhereby parents of children attending either a public school or a non-
profit, nonpublic school were reimbursed by the state for expenses in-
curred in transporting their children to and from school on the public
transit system. 2 3 Similarly, the Court in Allen upheld a New York stat-
ute requiring local public school authorities to loan textbooks free of
charge to all students enrolled in schools which complied with the state's
compulsory education law, including students attending nonpublic
schools.124 Although the true meaning of Everson and Allen is a matter of
considerable dispute, even within the Supreme Court, this much is set-
tled: the critical factor in each case was that the assistance provided was
"so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function"
of the affected church-related schools that it could not be said to consti-
tute impermissible aid to religion.
125
The traditional view of the child-benefit doctrine is derived from the
proposition that assistance provided to individuals, rather than to the
church-related institutions which those individuals happen to attend, is
not aid to religion and is not forbidden by the establishment clause. 2 ' At
least three Justices subscribe to this traditional view. One, of course, is
Justice White, the author of the majority opinion in Allen.2 7 The second
is Justice Rehnquist.' 28 The third and most adamant proponent of the
traditional view of the Everson-Allen child-benefit concept is Chief Jus-
tice Burger. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Chief Justice reaffirmed the vi-
tality of the traditional view of Everson and Allen by relying upon it to
distinguish the legislation at issue.129 The Chief Justice's dissent in Ny-
--- 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
122 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
13 330 U.S. at 16-17. The statutory reimbursement was provided to parents of children
attending nonprofit, nonpublic schools, including parochial schools. Id. at 3.
"" 392 U.S. at 248. The Court observed that the textbooks loaned were subject to approval
of public school authorities. One of the requirements for approval was that the books had to
be secular in nature. Id. at 244-45.
11' See id. at 242-44. Justice White noted that the New York statute furthered its purpose
of providing educational opportunities to children, and that although free books may en-
courage a child to attend a sectarian school, that does not "alone demonstrate an unconsti-
tutional degree of support for a religious institution." Id. at 244. Justice White also pointed
to the fact that the financial benefits accrued not to the schools, but rather to the parents of
the children. Id.
, See id. at 243-44; Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see also infra notes 127-29.
", See 392 U.S. at 243-44.
'u Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 812-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" 403 U.S. at 621. The Chief Justice recognized that the Pennsylvania statute
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quist contains further documentation of the constitutional validity of the
Everson-Allen principle that assistance to individuals is not "aid" to
religion. " '
Federal tuition tax credit legislation undoubtedly would be approved
under the traditional view of Everson and Allen as long as the tax bene-
fits would accrue to the parents, and not to the schools to which those
parents send their children. In such a case, there would be no direct bene-
fits to religious institutions. Indeed, it cannot be said with any certainty
that federal tuition tax credits would even indirectly accord financial ben-
efits to church-related schools, since any expendable monies which par-
ents may enjoy on account of the credits would be spent as they chose.
While the schools may receive an indirect benefit in that the parents may
be more likely to send their children to nonpublic rather than public
schools, such assistance, as expressed by Everson and Allen, does not
contravene the establishment clause."'
Unfortunately, the Court recently has not had occasion to consider
fully the child-benefit doctrine of Allen and Everson. In Americans
United for Separation of Church & State v. Blanton,"2 however, the
Court hinted that it had returned to the classic reading of Allen and Ev-
erson, as urged by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist.1 3 3
ha[d] the ... defect of providing . . . financial aid directly to the church-related
school. This factor distinguishes both Everson and Allen, for in both those cases the
Court was careful to point out that . . . aid was provided to the student and his
parents-not to the church-related school.
Id.
13o 413 U.S. at 799-802 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice stated that although
there is not a straight line running through the Court's interpretation of the establishment
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment, one basic and solid principle does ex-
ist-the establishment clause does not forbid the creation of a general welfare system which
distributes welfare benefits to private individuals. Id.
"' See Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44; Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. According to the interpretation of
Everson and Allen advanced by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist,
federal tax credits for nonpublic school tuition are not constitutionally distinguishable from
financial reimbursement for nonpublic school transportation. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 803
(Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 820-21 (White, J., dis-
senting). Justice Powell disagrees with the Burger-White-Rehnquist reading of Everson and
Allen, and apparently believes that the separability found to exist in those cases does not
derive exclusively from the fact that the benefits went to parents and children rather than
to schools, but from some other combination of elements. In Nyquist, Justice Powell argued
that Everson and Allen did not create an irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality:
"[Tihose decisions make it clear that, far from providing a per se immunity from examina-
tion of the substance of the State's program, the fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather
than to the schools is only one among many factors to be considered." Id. at 781.
'' 434 U.S. 803 (1977), afg 433 F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn.).
" See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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Blanton was a summary affirmance" 4 of a federal district court decision
which upheld a state student assistance program.' 35 The principal basis
for the district court's decision in favor of the legislation was that, like
Everson and Allen, "the emphasis [was] . . . on the student rather than
the institution."' 36
According to what remains of Justice Powell's reading of Everson
and Allen, it appears that federal tuition tax credit legislation, which
would assure that tax credits accrue directly to the benefit of parents,
would receive favorable constitutional treatment. Such legislation seem-
ingly is valid since direct disbursement to parents is at least presump-
tively indicative of a "guarantee of separation" between the assistance
provided and the religious functions of whatever church-related institu-
tions may be incidentally benefited. s3  Although the Powell application of
the child-benefit doctrine leaves open the possibility that other aspects of
the legislation may be so constitutionally infirm as to require elimination
of the Everson-Allen presumption of validity, there is nothing which pre-
cludes the creation of a statute avoiding such infirmities. Other factors,
considered below, also support the constitutionality of federal tuition tax
credits. s8
Separability and Allocation of Aid to Secular Functions
It is settled that nonideological assistance to nonpublic education
does not contravene the establishment clause. In Regan, for example, re-
imbursements to nonpublic schools for costs incurred in conducting state-
required testing and in maintaining records necessary for compliance with
state minimum education standards were approved because such activi-
ties, even when undertaken by church-related schools, are religiously neu-
tral. ' As the court stated in National Coalition for Public Education v.
Harris,'4 "[clases such as Regan, Hunt, and Tilton reveal that under cer-
tain circumstances, the government may furnish funds or services directly
to a sectarian institution if their use is effectively restricted to non-reli-
" See 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 97, 105
(M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977). The student assistance program was enacted by the
Tennessee General Assembly to provide "needy students with the financial assistance neces-
sary to attend the accredited college of their choice in Tennessee." 433 F. Supp. at 99.
'" Id. at 104. The court noted that college students are not as susceptible to religious indoc-
trination as elementary or secondary school students, id. at 103, and that no single religion
is favored by the program, id. at 104.
" See Allen, 392 U.S. at 244-45; Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-17.
"4 See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
"3 444 U.S. at 656-57.
110 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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gious functions and activities."141
The premise underlying the principle applied in Regan and Harris is
that even church-related schools have more than just a religious function.
To the extent that nonpublic schools engage in providing a basic secular
education, they are fulfilling and advancing a public purpose which other-
wise would be satisfied by government. 42 According to the Regan-Harris
principle, governmental assistance to this secular nonideological function
would appear constitutional, since such assistance promotes only the
clearly identifiable secular function of providing a basic education, and
otherwise is religiously neutral. 4 3
Separability and Affirmative Government Assistance
On the one hand, direct payments by government to church-related
schools in order to further the religious missions of those schools is un-
doubtedly impermissible.1" ' At the other extreme, exemption of religious
organizations from legal requirements incumbent upon similarly situated
nonreligious organizations can, under certain circumstances, be constitu-
tional.1 45 Indeed, in some cases, such an exemption of religious "persons"
may be mandated by the free exercise guarantee. 4
Being mindful of the fact that the rationale underlying the secular-
effect test's separability concern is to avoid a "symbolic identification" of
I,' d. at 1259.
Cf. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968) ("this Court has long recognized
that religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education").
"I Tax assistance programs were held unconstitutional in previous cases on the ground that
the amount of the particular tax benefit was unrelated to the amount of nonpublic school
tuition actually paid. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 791; Norberg, 630 F.2d at 857; Public Funds
for Pub. Schools, 590 F.2d at 576; Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, 302 Minn. at 219-20,
224 N.W.2d at 345-46. In each case, the fact that the legislation was arbitrary with respect
to the amount of allowable tax benefits was a sufficient basis to find a lack of adequate
separation between the educational assistance provided and the religious training functions
of the church-related schools.
" See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. In Everson, the Court stated: "[N]o tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." Id. at 16.
116 Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-80 (1970) (the tax exempt status of religious
organizations is fundamental in American history, and to exclude such organizations from
the tax exempt status accorded to other nonprofit organizations would place religion at a
relative disadvantage).
4I Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20
(1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (disqualification from unemployment
compensation benefits due to refusal to perform certain work violated first amendment). A
legislature may have discretion to alleviate burdens imposed on free exercise and religious
voluntarism, which are not sufficient to constitute violations of the first amendment, even
though the process of accomodation involves a departure from the principles of separation.
Note, supra note 3, at 710.
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government with religion, it seems clear that there is a greater likelihood
of such identification when government takes affirmative steps to provide
direct assistance to religiously affiliated institutions. Conversely, that
likelihood diminishes significantly when aid is not affirmative, but rather
consists merely of government abstention from imposing a legal burden
which otherwise could be imposed, such as exempting religious organiza-
tions from a tax which could be levied upon them. 1 7 In the latter situa-
tion, since there is no positive governmental action, there is less chance
that government will be viewed as taking steps to sponsor religion.148
Such a distinction between presumptively impermissible affirmative and
direct assistance on the one hand, and presumptively permissible indirect
and exemptive government conduct on the other, was recognized by the
courts in Kosydar v. Wolman,' 4 and Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v.
Roemer.150
Although the question is a difficult one, it appears that federal tui
tion tax credits are more in the nature of exemptive governmental activ-
ity and, thus, are constitutional. In Roemer, for example, the court relied
upon the exemptive activity theory in upholding a tuition tax deduction
statute." 1 Perhaps more significantly, Chief Justice Burger determined
that this affirmative-exemptive distinction militates strongly in favor of
the tax exemptions for churches which were upheld in Walz.1 5' Both the
tax exemption of Walz and the tax deduction of Roemer were held consti-
tutionally valid. Both, in essence, involved alleviation of a tax burden
through noncollection of a tax which otherwise could be levied. 58 It is
possible, of course, that a low-income taxpayer who takes a tax credit
may be entitled to a payment from the government, but that result re-
flects no more than the taxpayer's overall tax status, of which a tax credit
"4 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[t]ax exemptions . . . constitute
mere passive State involvement with religion and not the affirmative involvement character-
istic of outright governmental subsidy").
148 See id. at 674-76; Note, supra note 3, at 714-15.
14 353 F. Supp. 744, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S.
910 (1973).
452 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (D. Minn. 1978).
Id. at 1321-22.
'5, Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-76. Chief Justice Burger stated:
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect
economic benefit.
[But the] grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does
not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that
the church support the state .... There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption
and establishment of religion [since tax] . . . exemption creates only a minimal and
remote involvement between church and state.
Id.
153 See id.; Roemer, 452 F. Supp. at 1322.
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for one item is merely a part. The tax credit alone, like any exemption or
deduction, requires no affirmative steps on the part of the government.
1 54
Indeed, the similarity between the measures approved in Walz and Roe-
mer is reinforced by Nyquist. There the Court noted that, constitution-
ally, it is irrelevant whether a tax measure is termed a "deduction," a
"credit," or even a "modification." Rather, substance must control over
form.
15 5
Moreover, Nyquist's invalidation of New York's tuition tax-benefit
program does not undermine the conclusion that a mere exemptive tax
measure is constitutionally valid. The tax-benefit program struck down in
Nyquist was not enacted, nor did it exist in isolation; it was part of a
broader plan which included New York's tuition reimbursement grant
program.1 5 6 As the Court noted, the tuition tax-benefit sections of the
challenged New York legislation were intended to be "comparable to, and
compatible with, the tuition grant" sections.1 5 7 The Court further stated
that, given this close relationship between the two programs, if the tuition
grant measure were unconstitutional, then the tax-benefit measure also is
invalid. 58 To a large extent, therefore, the constitutional defects in New
York's tuition tax-benefit program were a function of that program's "le-
gally inseparable" ties to the tuition grant program. 59 Whether the tax-
benefit plan would have been held unconstitutional absent those ties is
debatable, although Roemer and particularly Walz indicate that such a
purely or at least predominantly exemptive tax measure would be permis-
sible. In any event, the unique aspects of the integrated legislation at is-
sue in Nyquist prevent that decision from having considerable preceden-
tial weight on this question. The more relevant precedents are Walz and
Roemer, and they favor the conclusion that predominantly exemptive
measures are constitutional.
Breadth, National Legislation and Genuine Tax-Benefit Programs
Whereas the Nyquist Court purported to rely primarily upon the
separability factor and the assertion that sufficient separation cannot ex-
ist if assistance to nonpublic education has a "significantly religious"
flavor, the Court explicitly avoided consideration of the "breadth" aspect
of the secular-effect test. 60 Indeed, the Court observed that its decision
'5 See Note, supra note 3, at 715. A tax credit plan "requires no administrative apparatus
for direct distribution of government funds to schools." Id.
151 413 U.S. at 789-90.
I" See id. at 764.
157 Id. at 790.
I" Id. at 791 n.50.
'59 See id.
160 But see L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 845 ("the narrowness of the benefited class was a key
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should not be construed as extending to such legislation as the GI Bill of
Rights"' which accords educational assistance to a broad class of
beneficiaries."'3
Significantly, both of the examples to which the Court referred in
limiting the scope of Nyquist involved national legislation, whereas Ny-
quist and other cases which have invalidated tuition tax-benefit programs
were concerned with state legislation. This distinction between the
sources of legislation challenged under the establishment clause is highly
significant to the breadth aspect of the secular-effect test. " Because the
underlying concern of the breadth factor is avoidance of any symbolic
identification by the general public of governmental assistance with reli-
gious activity, it is apparent that facially neutral legislation at the na-
tional level, directed at a broad cross-section of the nation's population, is
less likely to involve any such symbolic identification.""'
The purpose of tuition tax-benefit legislation is to preserve educa-
tional opportunity for all persons, without regard to religious persuasion.
Yet, in a state where the beneficiaries of such legislation are concentrated
into only a few denominations, or even where the entire constituency of
the state is comprised predominantly of persons adhering to only a hand-
ful of religious beliefs, such a purpose probably will not be achieved, at
least not in a neutral fashion. 1" As the Court noted in Nyquist, under
such circumstances the primary beneficiaries of the legislation would not
be all persons regardless of religious attitude, but rather a select group of
certain politically powerful religious adherents.'"
National educational assistance legislation, in contrast, is not suscep-
tible to this criticism. Such legislation would benefit persons of all reli-
gious beliefs, regardless of geographic distributions or concentrations. In-
deed, national religious diversity serves to ensure proportionate
representation in Congress, a factor which likely would not exist in the
legislatures of states in which certain faiths are highly concentrated. Re-
ligiously proportionate representation and distribution of benefits, in
turn, permit federal legislation to coincide more closely with the goal of
preserving freedom of educational choice. The simple fact that such legis-
lation is national in character guarantees that the class of beneficiaries
will be far broader than any class which possibly could be benefited by
factor in .. .Nyquist").
.11 38 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
162 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 n.38.
163 See L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 845.
See id. at 844.
Is See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768.
See id.
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comparable state legislation.16 7
Although the case of Americans United for Separation of Church &
State v. Blanton"' addressed the constitutionality of a higher education
student assistance grant program,"19 the rationale employed in resolving
this issue would apply to federal tuition tax credit legislation. In affirming
the constitutionality of the student assistance grant program, the Blanton
court referred to Durham v. McLeod, 17 a case which was dismissed by
the Supreme Court for lack of a substantial federal question on the same
date that Nyquist was decided:1 7 1
In the instant case, as in Durham, the emphasis of the aid program is
on the student rather than the institution, and the institutions are free to
compete for the students who have money provided by the program. No one
religion is favored by the program, nor are private or religious institutions
favored over public institutions.17 2
Blanton thus upheld the legislation because it accorded benefits to a
broad class of beneficiaries. Federal tuition tax credit legislation, which
would be a mere part of the Internal Revenue Code, would have a similar
Me See Tuition Tax Relief Bills, 1978: Hearings on S. 2142 Before the Subcomm. on Taxa-
tion and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Finance Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
295-97, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. 8707-08 (1978) (statement of A. Scalia). At subcommit-
tee hearings of the Senate Finance Committee, it was stated:
[A] final distinction, perhaps the most critical, between the present bill (S. 2142) and
the laws struck down in Nyquist ... is that here we are talking about a federal law.
It is unquestionable that the Supreme Court... is more disposed to accord validity
to the acts of this Congress than to those of state legislatures .... In the individual
States, where, not infrequently, a single denomination accounts for a majority or a
near majority of the electorate, the danger that the legislature will aid a particular
religion under the guise of pursuing purely secular governmental ends is sometimes
acute, and justifies particularly rigorous application of anti-establishment principles,
even at the expense of other constitutional values which might otherwise
predominate. In the national legislature, by contrast, no single religious sect predomi-
nates, and the danger of sectarian action in favor of a particular group is negligible.
Id. at 296-97. The Supreme Court has indicated that national legislation is entitled to
greater judicial deference under the establishment clause. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 678-82 (1971) (upholding Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act, which
provided construction grants to secular and church-related colleges); National Coalition for
Pub. Educ. v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248, 1257-70 (S.D.N.Y.) (upholding constitutionality of
Title I of Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which provided that certain
government funds be used for the instruction of pupils by public schoolteachers in parochial
schools), appeal dismissed sub nom. National Coalition for Pub. Educ. v. Hufstedler, 449
U.S. 808 (1980).
30 433 F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 424 U.S. 803 (1977).
'" 433 F. Supp. at 98.
170 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972).
.7 413 U.S. 902 (1973).
17 433 F. Supp. at 104.
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effect. In addition, Blanton involved state legislation and, as noted above,
federal legislation inherently carries with it greater "breadth" than com-
parable state enactments. 17 Hence, the Blanton rationale appears to be
sufficiently persuasive so as to dismiss the fear that federal tuition tax
credit legislation involves impermissible religious benefits.
One need not search to find congressional precedent for federal tui-
tion tax credit legislation. In 1943, President Roosevelt sent two memo-
randa to Congress urging the development of legislation aimed at easing
the burdens of returning servicemen. On June 22, 1944, Congress enacted
the first so-called G.I. Bill.1"4 Among other things, this bill provided for
educational assistance payments to veterans who wished to complete or
continue their education."" Additional evidence of congressional support
for sectarian education was the enactment of statutory provisions provid-
ing reimbursement to the District of Columbia public school system for
expenses incurred in the education of congressional and Supreme Court
pages. 17 The federal government also makes monthly educational assis-
tance payments directly to senior R.O.T.C. students,17 7 and even pays the
full tuition of selected 4-year R.O.T.C. students. '7 The R.O.T.C. cadet at
Notre Dame receives the same check as his counterpart at Ohio State. No
one has ever labeled this practice as "establishment" of religion.
Another precedent for federal tuition tax credit legislation lies in the
federal government's exemption of religious organizations from payment
of income tax, and in the deductions granted for charitable contribu-
tions.17 9 The history of these exemptions and deductions reveals a legisla-
tive conviction that the loss of revenue is more than offset by the relief
'" See supra note 167.
171 Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944).
171 Id. at 287-91. The current legislation providing educational assistance benefits for veter-
ans and their families is embodied in chapters 34 and 35 of title 38 of the United States
Code. Section 1681(a) of title 38 provides for the payment of a specified amount each month
to any qualified veteran "to meet, in part, the expenses of the veteran's subsistence, tuition,
fees, supplies, books, equipment, and other educational costs." 38 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
In sections 1691 and 1692, Congress authorized payments to educationally disadvantaged
veterans who desire to complete their high school education, or who need tutorial or other
remedial assistance in order to begin college. See id. §§ 1691, 1692.
"' See 2 U.S.C. § 88a(a)-(c) (1976). Congress is obligated to reimburse the District of Co-
lumbia for its expenses whether the page attends a public, private or sectarian school. Id.
M' See 37 U.S.C. § 209 (1976); cf. Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 412 n.17 (S.D. Ohio
1972) ("if religious schools indirectly derive benefit from [the R.O.T.C.] . . . programs, this
benefit is entirely incidental and subordinate to the legitimate secular purposes underlying
their enactment").
118 See 10 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976).
See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c)(2)(B) (1982). In Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934),
the Supreme Court noted that tax deductions are granted for gifts to religious, educational
and other charitable organizations in order to encourage such contributions. Id. at 147.
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from financial burdens which the government otherwise would have to
meet by appropriations from public funds.6 0 The federal government,
through the Internal Revenue Code, also has provided tax credit incen-
tives for individual accomplishment of public purposes. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to interfere with legislative
flexibility respecting tax decisions.' 8
To the extent, therefore, that federal tuition tax credit legislation has
the necessary breadth and separability, it will not be symbolically identi-
fied with government support of religion. Benefits will accrue to all per-
sons who wish to take advantage of its provisions, not merely to religious
persons. Thus, such legislation should not be considered violative of the
establishment clause.
Alternative Bases for Finding Secular Effect
Although the separability and breadth considerations are central to
an analysis of whether legislation has a permissible secular effect, they are
not necessarily the sole considerations. Two other factors provide addi-
tional and alternative bases for the conclusion that federal tuition tax
credit legislation would have a constitutional secular effect: non-preferen-
tial treatment and the preservation of freedom of choice.
Breathing content into the religion clauses, and particularly into the
establishment clause, the Supreme Court has relied extensively upon the
intent of the Framers of the first amendment."8 ' When the first amend-
ment was adopted, "official" state religions and churches supported by
state revenues were commonplace.'8 " These churches were, in effect,
"agencies" of the various states which funded them.' " The intent of the
Framers in authoring the establishment clause was not to put an end to
380 See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Seas. 19 (1938).
181 See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1937). Inherent in
the nature of taxation is that the state be free to choose who it will tax and who it will not.
Id. A legislature is not obligated to tax every member of a class, it may make distinctions
provided it does so on a rational basis. Id. The congressional power to lay and collect taxes
conferred by article I, section 8 of the Constitution is subject to no greater restraints than
those imposed upon the taxing power of the states. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 581 (1937). The Court, in Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886),
stated that Congress, in the exercise of its taxing power, "may at its discretion wholly ex-
empt certain classes of property from taxation." Id. at 408. Gibbons was cited with approval
by the Walz Court to support its conclusion that property tax exemptions for religious insti-
tutions are constitutionally permissible. 397 U.S. at 679-80. A similar rationale should apply
to tuition tax credits.
01 See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 770 n.28; Everson, 330 U.S. at 10-14.
183 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 10-11 & nn.6-10; C. ANTIEAU, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTAB-
LISHMENT 1-2 (1964); Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L.
REv. 53, 55-58 (1946).I" W. TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIous RIGHTS IN AMERICA 171 (1948).
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the "official" state churches. The Framers merely intended to protect
state prerogatives to maintain their own religions by prohibiting the na-
tional government from disestablishing the "official" state churches and
in their place establishing a "national" religion.185
To accomplish their goal of preventing national disestablishment of
state churches, the Framers did not erect a total prohibition of all federal
assistance to religious interests."8 ' Instead, through the establishment
clause, the Framers sought to prevent any preferential treatment by Con-
gress of any particular religion.8 7 According to the Founding Fathers, the
establishment clause permitted federal aid to religious interests as long as
such aid was not disbursed in a religiously discriminatory manner."8 8
The Framers' concern with religious preference arose from their be-
lief that religious diversity inherently leads to religious freedom.1 8 ' Such
pluralism, of course, would be destroyed if the strength of the federal gov-
ernment were placed behind one religion. For example, in the constitu-
tional debates, James Madison proposed to include among the enumer-
ated powers of Congress the authority "to establish a University, in which
no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of reli-
gion."190 The proposal was defeated by two votes, but only because
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania was able to convince the delegates
that it was unnecessary, since both the power to create such a university
and the prohibition of religious preferences were already within the list-
ing of enumerated congressional powers.1 9' Certainly, federal tuition tax
credit legislation would not involve religious "preferences," as that con-
cept was understood and written into the Constitution by the Framers.
Since it is not a congressional attempt to promote a national religion,
such legislation apparently comports with the fundamental purposes of
the establishment clause.
Examination of the historical record of religion clauses, however,
1* Kruse, The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Reli-
gion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65, 127-30 (1962); Snee, Religious
Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371, 373-90.
' See Snee, supra note 185, at 373-90.
15 E. CORWIN, A CoNsrrrUrlON OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 116 (1951); see J. O'NEILL,
RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTIoN 105 (1949).
,u See Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring).
' See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 355-59 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
'" 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 616 (rev. ed. 1966).
"' Id. Professor Corwin has summarized the original understanding of the Founding
Fathers:
The historical record shows beyond peradventure that the core idea of "an estab-
lishment of religion" comprises the idea that any act of public authority favorable to
religion in general cannot without manifest falsification of history be brought under
the ban of that phrase.
E. CORWIN, supra note 187, at 116.
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reveals more than just a concern with religious preferences. The Supreme
Court itself has recognized two fundamental and guiding principles which
subsist in the clauses: "voluntarism," that matters of conscience and be-
lief should be left to the free choice of the individual, without undue re-
straint or coercion by government;9 2 and "separatism," that church and
state should remain institutionally separate with neither the state becom-
ing involved in religious affairs nor religious disputes giving rise to politi-
cal divisiveness."9 '
In many respects, there is an inherent conflict between these princi-
ples. On the one hand, voluntarism mandates that government not bur-
den the practice of religion. Indeed, under certain circumstances, it even
may require affirmative governmental action in order to alleviate the col-
lateral coercive effects of facially neutral legislation.1 94 Separatism, on the
other hand, dictates that government shall not aid religion.' 91 If either
principle is applied literally, it is conceivable that there will be a breach
of the other.'"
Due to this natural antagonism, the general rule which has evolved is
one of "neutrality.1 0 97 In developing this rule, however, the Court never
has accepted the theory of "strict neutrality," under which "government
cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because . ..
[the religion clauses] prohibit classification in terms of religion either to
confer a benefit or to impose a burden." ' Instead, the Court has adopted
a position of "flexible neutrality." As Chief Justice Burger stated in Walz,
the religion clauses contain "room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality."1 9 Such flexible or benevolent neutrality is essen-
tial to allow meaningful resolution of the tension between the principles
which underlie the religion clauses."' Of the two principles, voluntarism
192 L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-3, at 818-19; see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
193 L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-3, at 819.
194 See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part
II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 517-18 (1968); e.g., Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
195 L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-4, at 820.
I" See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[t]here
are many situations where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into
head-on collision with the Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment
Clause" (footnote omitted)).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("[g]overnment in our democracy, state
and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice").
19 P. KURLAND, supra note 24, at 18.
'" Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
'00 See O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The O'Hair court described the
two religion clauses as "supplemental and compatible means" of achieving religious free-
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is said to be more fundamental in the constitutional sense, and hence
must take precedence whenever a conflict exists between the two.0 1
The tension between voluntarism and separatism can easily be seen
in the educational crisis toward which federal tuition tax credit legislation
is directed. As previously noted, the right of parents to send their chil-
dren to a nonpublic school, and particularly to a church-related school, is
constitutionally protected. 02 This parental right is at the core of those
rights falling within the ambit of the voluntarism/free choice principle.
Additionally, nonpublic schools play a crucial role in the overall scheme
of American education.'0 3 Yet, social and economic upheaval in recent de-
cades seriously has threatened both the ability of parents to exercise their
so-called constitutional right in a meaningful fashion and the ability of
nonpublic schools as a whole to serve as a viable alternative to public
instruction."°' Obviously, this threat to such important values is suffi-
ciently serious as to justify governmental intervention in the form of ex-
emptive assistance to nonpublic education. 05 Such assistance, in this
sense, can be viewed merely as an attempt to preserve the vitality of a
choice which, the Supreme Court has stated, is deserving of constitutional
protection. 06 It is, in other words, an attempt to preserve voluntarism.
Governmental assistance, however, also raises serious establishment and
separatism concerns.0 7 The resulting tension between the applicable con-
stitutional rules thus has been termed a "departure from neutrality. '2 08
Federal tuition tax credit legislation can be perceived as a congres-
sional attempt to remedy this departure from neutrality. Since the volun-
tarism value is more fundamental than its separatism counterpart, any
establishment problems created by federal tuition tax credits accordingly
should be subordinated to the constitutionally higher priority of ensuring
an environment in which religious liberty can have a meaningful exis-
tence. In this sense, federal tuition tax credit legislation, if enacted, would
dom. Id.
'o See L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-3, at 818-19. The principle of voluntarism dictates that
the individual's freedom of belief and conscience be protected from governmental interfer-
ence or involvement. Id.
202 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
'o8 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Justice Powell believed that, among other things, parochial schools "relieve substan-
tially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools." Id. (Powell, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
'" See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 813-18 (White, J., dissenting); Moynihan, Why Private Schools
Merit Public Aid, Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
006 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 819-20 (White, J., dissenting).
'" See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
"0" See generally Hunter, The Continuing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 523, 528-53 (1980).
"00 Note, supra note 3, at 702.
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be a means of assuring that parents will be able to exercise their constitu-
tional right to send their children to a nonpublic school. Its consequent
effect would be to promote constitutional norms, and not to violate those
embodied in the effect element of the establishment clause test.0 9
It is likely that opponents of federal tuition tax credit legislation will
assert that such a voluntarism argument was made and rejected in Ny-
quist. It is true that in Nyquist, the State of New York contended that
"its program of tuition grants should survive scrutiny because it is
designed to promote the free exercise of religion."21 0 The Court, neverthe-
less, held that the program did not satisfy the no-aid, secular-effect stan-
dard. For two reasons, however, that holding does not necessarily connote
that the voluntarism argument is invalid when applied to federal tuition
tax-benefit legislation.
First, Nyquist's consideration of the free exercise issue was colored, if
not controlled, by its adoption of the no-aid standard, the current validity
of which is highly questionable. The Nyquist majority took an exceed-
ingly narrow view of the concept of neutrality. Rather than analyzing
neutrality in terms of the overall context of governmental school financ-
ing, Justice Powell and the Nyquist majority considered only the specific
program in question. " " They looked only at the provisions of the legisla-
tion before them.1 2 Indeed, at least one other commentator has observed
that "[t]he overall effect of the government's school financing pro-
grams-with its disincentives as well as incentives to private educa-
tion-was not evaluated.121 2 Accordingly, the Court did not engage in
"balancing any government-created or government-enhanced burdens on
the choice of private schools against the tax incentive. '21 4 Just as Chief
Justice Burger believed that the no-aid test was an unjustified statement
of constitutional doctrine, the Chief Justice disagreed with the majority's
narrow view of neutrality and school financing.""a Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, would have examined the volun-
tarism argument in light of the cumulative effect of all government
financing for schools.2 1 6
'" Cf. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("[w]here the state law is genuinely directed at enhancing a recognized freedom of individu-
als, even one involving both secular and religious consequences, such as the right of parents
to send their children to private schools .. the Establishment Clause no longer has a pro-
hibitive effect" (citation omitted)).
,,0 Id. at 788.
"' See id. at 788-89.
" See Note, supra note 3, at 707.$13 Id.
' Id.
See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 804 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
,e Id. at 803 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Chief Justice Burger
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To the extent that the no-aid standard has since been disapproved,
the narrow view of neutrality taken in Nyquist also must be considered
suspect. Aside from the more permissive secular-effect test now being ap-
plied by the Court, the other decisions since Nyquist indicate that Chief
Justice Burger's broad view of neutrality is now the accepted position.
Particularly on point is the recent decision of Widmar v. Vincent,217 in
which a student religious group brought a free exercise/voluntarism chal-
lenge against a university regulation that prohibited the use of university
facilities for religious worship or instruction.'" The university argued
that to allow its facilities to be used by religious student groups would
constitute impermissible establishment of religion.2 1 9 In rejecting this ar-
gument and holding for the students, the Court relied heavily upon its
observation that university facilities were made available generally to all
nonreligious groups. 220 The Court looked beyond the mere language of the
legislation before it and considered the effect of the law in the overall
context of the university's treatment of all student groups. Such an ap-
proach is the exact opposite of that employed by the Nyquist majority. It
is, instead, the position advocated by Chief Justice Burger in his Nyquist
dissent. According to the Chief Justice's view, when tuition tax-benefit
legislation is examined in the broader context of all government school
financing, it is clearly permissible as a means of equalizing opportunities
and preserving choices protected by the Constitution.2
The nature and source of the legislation itself provides a second rea-
son favoring the conclusion that, contrary to what can be read into Ny-
quist, federal tuition tax credits would be found constitutional under the
voluntarism argument. Nyquist, and the decisions following it, involved
state legislation. Legislative preservation of freedom of educational choice
is essentially a matter of civil rights. Although the states undoubtedly are
authorized to act in this area, civil rights and their protection are pecu-
liarly the province of the federal government.22 As such, federal legisla-
described the plan as "no more than simple equity." Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
21 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
, Id. at 266.
*" Id. at 270-71.
120 Id. at 274.
", Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 803 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980); Wheeler
v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 426 (1974). In Regan, the Court upheld a New York plan which
provided for direct reimbursement to private schools for costs incurred in the administra-
tion of state mandated tests and record-keeping services. 444 U.S. at 662. The Wheeler
Court held that nonpublic schoolchildren are entitled to services for the educationally de-
prived comparable to those provided to public schoolchildren under Title I of the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 241a (1976). 417 U.S. at 428.
m" See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 (1979); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
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tion in aid of constitutional rights should be entitled to greater judicial
deference than that exhibited in Nyquist22
In sum, federal tuition tax credits should pass the more flexible secu-
lar-effect test since it is consistent with the child-benefit doctrine ap-
proved in Allen and Everson, satisfies the separability and breadth crite-
ria so often stressed by the Court, and comports with the original
understanding of the type of governmental action permissible under the
establishment clause. Furthermore, such legislation may be viewed as a
congressional attempt to protect the freedom of choice guaranteed by the
first amendment and not to promote specific religious values.22
Given the confusion existing in this area of the law, absolute predic-
tions as to the constitutionality of any legislation are impossible. Never-
theless, compelling and supportable arguments may be made that federal
tuition tax credit legislation would have a permissible secular effect.
2 25
That leaves for consideration the last element of the Court's three-part
test-that of "excessive entanglements."
FEDERAL TUITION TAX CREDITS AND EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENTS
As noted earlier, the excessive-entanglements prong of the current
Supreme Court standard first appeared in Chief Justice Burger's rather
abrupt statement in Walz that legislation also must avoid "excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion. '22 6 In Lemon, it subsequently be-
came clear that excessive entanglement was a distinct and independent
element of establishment clause analysis.2 2 7 As its name suggests, the en-
tanglements test is concerned principally with governmental involvement
with religious interests.2 28 The Court has recognized, however, that "some
involvement and entanglement is inevitable" and hence permissible. 2 '
Indeed, the Walz Court observed that the "test is inescapably one of
U.S. 452, 464 (1974).
223 See supra note 181.
224 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
S Some of the legitimate secular reasons which can be advanced for the enactment of fed-
eral tuition tax credit legislation are that private education provides an alternative to public
schools and fosters "wholesome competition," Wolman, 433 U.S. at 262 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part), that the states' financial burden of supporting public
schools is reduced, id., and that middle income parents paying tuition need a tax break to
compensate for inflation, Hunter, supra note 207, at 527. There is no question that the
collapse of a viable and affordable private alternative would be disastrous for many states'
public school systems.
... Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
... Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
228 Id.
". Id. at 625.
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degree.""'
The entanglements concept itself is divided into two further inquir-
ies, one concerning administrative entanglements and whether govern-
ment has become involved directly in the operations of sectarian institu-
tions, 3 ' and the second concerning political entanglements and whether
legislation creates the potential for excessive political divisiveness or frag-
mentation along religious lines.2 32 No court ever has invalidated a tuition
tax-benefit program on the ground that it involved an impermissible ad-
ministrative entanglement, and it is extremely unlikely that a court would
do so.23 In Waiz, the Court identified three types of administrative in-
volvement forbidden by the establishment clause: (1) substantive govern-
mental evaluation of religious practices;22 4 (2) "extensive state investiga-
tion into church operations and finances";' " and (3) governmental
classification "of what is or is not religious."2 6 Tuition tax-benefit legisla-
tion obviously implicates none of these considerations. As previously dis-
cussed, such legislation is more in the nature of exemptive, rather than
affirmative, governmental action.2 37 Without affirmative action, it is diffi-
cult to see how there could be any direct governmental involvement with
religion."3 '
The political entanglements issue presents a more difficult question.
Each court which has invalidated tuition tax-benefit legislation has done
so on secular-effect grounds,23 9 and most of these courts did not engage in
an entanglements analysis. 240 In Nyquist, however, the Court did make
the gratuitous observation that New York's tuition tax-benefit program
raised certain political entanglement problems. 4 1 The Nyquist Court rea-
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soned that such a program could lead to political pressure for frequent
enlargement of the tax benefit provided.24 2 "In this situation," the Court
concluded, "the potential for seriously divisive political consequences
needs no elaboration.
'242
Elaboration, however, would have been most helpful,.for the political
divisiveness potentially created by New York's legislation was by no
means obvious. The Court did not cite to any evidence indicating that
there had been political fragmentation along religious lines, or that there
had been political pressure to increase the tax benefit accorded. The sum-
mary entanglements analysis given in Nyquist was totally unnecessary to
the Court's decision. Notwithstanding the vague meaning of the Nyquist
Court's comments on political divisiveness, one thing is certain: the Court
was not suggesting that the establishment clause forbids political advo-
cacy by religious groups. 24 Such a position would clearly be untenable in
light of the recent decision in Widmar v. Vincent, in which the Court
held that religious speech and association are protected fully by the first
amendment.2 45 Certain other aspects of the political-entanglements con-
cept also are settled, and they indicate that federal tuition tax credit leg-
islation would not create such a degree of political-religious fragmenta-
tion as to give rise to unconstitutionality.
In his separate opinion in Walz, Justice Harlan elaborated upon the
reason why interface between political activity and religion is a subject of
establishment clause concern:
What is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of
government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to
lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking
point. 46
Few would disagree with Justice Harlan's observation. Legislation should
be invalidated if it carries with it the potential for straining the "political
system to the breaking point." That, of course, is an extreme situation,
and one which is not present in the case of tuition tax-benefit legisla-
tion. 47 Indeed, in both Nyquist and Walz, the Court indicated that tax
242 Id. at 797.
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legislation is even less likely to lead to political disruption because it does
not involve the necessity for annual budget appropriations that do accom-
pany government-grant programs. " 8 Therefore, one of the fundamental
ingredients of political divisiveness, namely, annual legislative appropria-
tions in order to continue the operation of a governmental aid program, is
notably absent in the case of federal tuition tax credit legislation. 249 It
thus appears that such legislation is less vulnerable to attack because of
political entanglements than legislation involving outlays of government
funds. 50
Additionally, the political entanglements issue, in essence, is con-
cerned with "special benefits" for religious groups. " ' Such a special-bene-
fit rationale derives from the prohibition of religious preferences.25 2 Na-
tional tuition tax credit legislation is unlikely to involve religious
preferences, particularly when the legislation confers benefits upon a
broad class of persons in a facially neutral fashion. Similar reasoning was
expressed by the court in National Coalition for Public Education v.
Harris," which upheld provisions of Title I of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965.254 In concluding that the Act does not pre-
sent the potential for political divisiveness, the Harris court emphasized
that it was national legislation, that it had a broad base of beneficiaries,
and that it was only part of a much larger social welfare program.5 5 Each
of these factors also can be found in federal tuition tax credit legislation.
Harris additionally stressed that there was no evidence that enactment
and implementation of Title I had given rise to divisive religious fragmen-
tation in Congress."' A similar consideration is applicable here. Although
tuition tax credits have been a subject of congressional debate and careful
At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers that
prompted . . . the Establishment Clause . . . . The risk of significant religious or
denominational control over our democratic processes-or even of deep political divi-
sion along religious lines-is remote, and when viewed against the positive contribu-
tions of sectarian schools, any such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the contin-
uing oversight of this Court.
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scrutiny for a number of years, there is nothing to indicate that this de-
bate has risen to the level of religious dispute or infighting. Indeed, the
Court recently noted that careful consideration by Congress of the consti-
tutionality of its enactments should have just the opposite effect. In
Rostker v. Goldberg,2 5 7 the Court observed that an enactment is entitled
to heightened judicial deference when it previously has been scrutinized
carefully by Congress for constitutional deficiencies."'
Finally, political divisiveness along religious lines is not, standing
alone, an independent basis for striking down legislation.2 " On several
occasions, the Court has characterized it as merely a warning signal that
can lead to more careful scrutiny of legislation under the other elements
of the establishment clause test, but which does not "alone warrant the
invalidation of. .. laws that otherwise survive" those other elements. 6 0
Hence, even if federal tuition tax credit legislation spawns political-en-
tanglement problems, these problems alone would not justify holding the
legislation unconstitutional. Only if the legislation also runs afoul of the
other elements of the three-part standard would such a result be war-
ranted. As detailed throughout this Article, however, there is good reason
to believe that well-drafted federal tuition tax credit legislation would
satisfy these other elements.
CONCLUSION
The validity of governmental assistance to nonpublic education is
perhaps the most confused issue in the entire realm of constitutional
law.2 6 1 As Judge Weis has noted, the Supreme Court's cases on this sub-
ject exhibit a marked "lack of a principled and logical thread."26 2 Conse-
quently, accurate predictions as to how the courts will react to any given
piece of legislation are exceedingly difficult to make.
These comments hold equally true for federal tuition tax-benefit leg-
islation. In a nutshell, the case law offers little reassuring guidance. Nev-
ertheless, a careful reading of the cases and an analysis of the underlying
policy considerations indicate that well-drafted federal tuition tax credit
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legislation would be adjudged constitutional. At the very least, compelling
arguments can be made to support such a proposition.
In closing, perhaps the general observations of Justice Powell in Wol-
man v. Walter will serve to place the foregoing analysis into perspective:
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided
an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often af-
ford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public
schools. The State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating educa-
tion of the highest quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever
school their parents have chosen for them.'63
113 Wolman, 433 U.S. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

